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THE WAR SPREADS

THE EDITORS

SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

GLYN HUGHES

STRUGGLE AT SIMON FRASER

KATHLEEN GOUGH

The Nuclear Family

- L. HORNSTRA
- BOBBYE ORTIZ

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

We have been receiving an increasing stream of requests for permission to anthologize MR and MR Press materials. This is gratifying, and testifies to the growing interest in Marxism. But we would like to suggest that any of our readers who are arranging contracts with publishing houses try to get a fair clause covering permissions fees. It is proper for a publisher to require an editor to clear all permissions, and proper for him to charge all such payments against future royalties, but it is *not* proper for a publisher to require that these permissions be paid out of a too-small advance. The MR Press contract for this type of book obligates the Press to make advance payment for all permissions, reserving only the right to approve the size of the fees. This

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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THE WAR SPREADS

Perhaps it is no more than a truism to say that wars either end or they spread: an endless war is a spreading war. But at least it is a truism which should not be ignored or forgotten. In his speech of November 3rd, Nixon talked about ending the war in Vietnam, but the policies he opted for were in fact designed to prolong it indefinitely. There should therefore be no surprise that now, just a few months later, the war is spreading and gives every evidence of continuing to spread.

Up until near the end of March the spreading process centered in northern Laos, which is sandwiched in between the bulk of North Vietnam on the east and Thailand on the west and south. Last year the pro-American Laotians, including a private mercenary army maintained by the CIA, captured the Plain of Jars, a strategically situated plateau more or less in the middle of northern Laos. This seemed to guarantee protection to the government centers of Luang Prabang and Vientiane and to constitute a buffer zone separating the North Vietnamese from northern Thailand, where guerrilla insurgency is under way but still largely isolated from outside support. All this changed quite suddenly in February when an offensive by the revolutionary Pathet Lao troops (supported, according to the capitalist press, by North Vietnamese) routed the pro-American forces and recaptured the Plain of Jars. This offensive evoked a response from the Americans in the form of heavy bombings, involving a large proportion of the B-52s in the Southeast Asia area. It was this stepped-up bombing which called attention in the United States to the spreading of the war in Laos and had its repercussions in Washington, especially in the Senate.

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As usual, the bombings did not prove militarily decisive. The Plain of Jars remains in "enemy" hands, and it seems to be generally agreed, or at least feared, that the Pathet Lao and its allies can now proceed to take over all of northern Laos and link up with the Thai dissidents any time they choose to. That this is a setback for the Americans, with potential long-run consequences of far-reaching importance, seems clear. But there was not much the Americans could do about it. A look at the map is enough to show the impracticality of introducing U.S. ground forces into the area, which is 600 miles or so northwest of Saigon. Furthermore, an open escalation of the war at this time would ruin Nixon's carefully staged public-relations campaign to convince the American people that he is seriously trying to end the war.

It follows that a counter-move, to be effective, would have to be mounted elsewhere. And this may well be what accounts for at least the timing of the second stage of the spreading process—in Cambodia. The key move here was of course the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Chief of State, which took place on March 18th while the Prince was out of the country. Who wanted to get rid of Sihanouk and why? The Prince himself provided the answer in a speech delivered at the University of Paris several years ago:

> The reason why we are opposing the United States is based on this fact: since 1955 the United States has tried various means, including the most treacherous and dangerous, to force us to join their side as a meek satellite. This is why we have carried on fierce resistance and spoken not very politely.*

Anyone familiar with CIA operations in such countries as Iran and Guatemala need be in no doubt about the nature of the means to which Sihanouk was referring: promotion of right-wing politico-terrorist organizations (the *Khmers Serei* or Free Khmers), suborning of political and military leaders with bribes and offers of generous U.S. aid, and so on. It was Sihanouk's

* Quoted in Keith Buchanan, "Cambodia Between Peking and Paris," MR, December 1964, p. 487. This article, while perhaps somewhat over-idealizing the Prince, provides much information of help in understanding the present situation.

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great merit to have resisted all these efforts and thus to have spared his country and his people the twin horrors of war and American occupation. A dispatch to the *Washington Post* of March 14th, four days before Sihanouk's overthrow, made the point with dramatic emphasis:

"We could have had the billions of American dollars you see spent in Saigon, the skyscrapers and traffic jams of Bangkok, and the low-cost imported luxuries of Vientiane, if we had wished," said one government official recently. "But we also would have had, like those countries, American planes bombing our countryside, our cities filled with unemployed youths, a communist insurrection all around us, galloping inflation, and an enormous trade deficit." (Quoted in *I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly,* March 23.)

That these are precisely the blessings the new rulers of Cambodia are in the process of bringing down on their country hardly needs to be argued. According to the London *Economist* of March 21st, the new rulers of Cambodia have had a long-standing quarrel with Sihanouk:

Late last year they succeeded in launching a "new economic policy" opposed to Prince Sihanouk's system of state control. They clashed with him in December over a proposal to denationalize the banks. They believe that the economy has been doing badly ever since Prince Sihanouk rejected American aid in 1963. They will aim to secure new loans and a steady stream of foreign investment.

Here we have the tried-and-true formula for neocolonization and satellization, and it makes utter nonsense of the new leaders' protestations that their foreign policy will continue to be directed at the neutralization of the country.

As for the Americans, it can of course be taken for granted that a prime objective of their policy is—and, as Sihanouk's statement quoted above indicates, long has been—to integrate Cambodia solidly into their Southeast Asian empire. But, as is usually the case, a policy and the timing of its implementation are different matters requiring different explanations. Why did the anti-Sihanouk coup take place at precisely this time?

One obvious reason is that the Prince was out of the country. A head of state who has concentrated power in his own hands is much more vulnerable when he is away from the area where the power is exercised. This was illustrated in the over-

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throw of Kwame Nkrumah as President of Ghana, and it is confirmed by the coup in Cambodia. But absence from the country is not a sufficient explanation. After all, Sihanouk has made many trips abroad during his long years of rule, and up to now he has always managed to return unscathed. It seems likely that another factor was operating and that, given the domestic and international context, it played the decisive role. We refer to the urgent need of the Americans to escape from an increasingly untenable situation in Vietnam (and Laos).*

The nature of this untenable situation is of course well-known though not much discussed in the establishment media. In inheriting the Vietnam War from the Johnson administration, Nixon also inherited the danger of exactly the same kind of political death which struck Johnson down: *get out of Vietnam or suffer the consequences.* But get out of Vietnam he could not. The U.S. ruling class feels, with good reason, that defeat in Vietnam, which is exactly what withdrawal would be, would constitute a severe, and in the long run perhaps even fatal, blow to the whole structure of imperialist control over the Third World.** The ruling class is therefore not about to sanction, let alone encourage, a pull-out from Vietnam. What it does in effect is therefore to jettison an administration which fails to solve the insoluble problem of how to end the war in Vietnam while still winning it, and turns the very same problem over to a new administration, always hoping for a miracle.

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* In speaking of "the Americans" this way, we do not mean to imply a belief that the various agencies and individuals concerned with policy-making necessarily agree with each other or even know what some of the others are doing. The CIA, for example, undoubtedly enjoys a considerable degree of independence, and it may at times be able to create a *fait accompli* which forces the hands of those who are supposed to control it. But it is safe to assume that all those involved have pretty much the same conception of the national (i.e., ruling-class) interest, and that no course of action can be initiated and persisted in for long without the approval of the top policy-makers. We should therefore eschew "explanations" in terms of CIA-like plots and machinations, real though they are, and seek to identify the underlying interests involved in a given situation and the way the ruling class and its particular representatives and leaders at the time hope to benefit most (or lose least).

** For further discussion of this crucial point, see Review of the Month, "Vietnam: Endless War," MR, April 1969.

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This was the situation which faced Nixon when he took office, and it must be said that during his first year he handled it with great political skill. By promising to "Vietnamize" the war and gradually withdraw U.S. forces, revising the draft system, talking about going over to an all-volunteer army, etc., Nixon took the wind out of the anti-war movement's sails. But he accomplished this neat trick only by seeming to do what he was in fact not doing, i.e., moving toward a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. The respite was therefore in the nature of the case temporary, and the policy which produced it was certain to backfire as soon as its dupes woke up to what was really going on. In the meantime the poor fellow could only thrash around, vainly searching for a way out of the trap in which he was so firmly caught.

Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that, in the words of a *Wall Street Journal* reporter, "the desire to 'do something' pervades top levels of government and may overpower other 'common sense' advice that insists the U.S. ability to shape events is negligible."* Where the "do something" urge takes over, there is of course always ready a rationalization to explain why the contemplated action is the very acme of wisdom, the long-sought key to victory, etc., etc. We have seen this process in operation at every major turning point in Vietnam for nearly two decades now: the Cambodian escalation is merely the latest, and unfortunately probably not the last, in a long, long series.

The rationalization this time is nicely spelled out by the foreign affairs columnist of the *New York Times*, Cyrus Sulzberger. Here are excerpts from his column (under the heading "Has a Strategy Collapsed?") of March 27th:

> The key to Hanoi's effort to communize South Vietnam has been the technique of sanctuary warfare seeking to outflank and infiltrate the main target area from protected bases and supply routes in theoretically neutral Laos and Cambodia.
>
> If the dramatic new situation in Cambodia can be made to stick, this strategy will come to a dead end. Cambodia, as ter-

* Robert Keatley, under the headline "Nixon Feels Pressure To Expand Role of U.S. in the Fighting in Asia," *Wall Street Journal*, April 3, 1970.

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minus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply route across Laos, with its port of Sihanoukville for seaborne shipments to Hanoi's southern forces and as rehabilitation and reinforcement center for thousands of Communist troops, is crucially important. That is why Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow are all happy to help Prince Sihanouk attempt a comeback.

Sanctuaries are vital to modern revolutionary warfare. During the Greek civil conflict, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria served as safe havens from which the rebels of General Markos were supplied and to which they could retreat. Only after Tito broke with Moscow, closed off his frontier with Greece, and isolated Albania, was Athens able to squash the insurrection. . . .

Saigon could completely pacify the delta and reinsure the capital's safety if Cambodia becomes truly neutral and ceases to serve as a base for aggression by forces mustered, commanded, and supported by Hanoi. . . .

What is evident is that Hanoi's system of sanctuary warfare is threatened, and unless it can be forcibly re-established there is a chance that peace can eventually be arranged in South Vietnam as it was in Greece when the Albanian haven was cut off.

It is not necessary here to undertake to expose all the fallacies in this pipe dream of the military and its journalistic apologists—to show, for example, how basically different the Vietnamese situation today is from the Greek situation of the late 1940s. But it is necessary to point out that Sulzberger's basic assumption—that the war in Vietnam results from "Hanoi's effort to communize South Vietnam," and represents "aggression by forces mustered, commanded, and supported by Hanoi" —is U.S. ruling-class mythology which approaches no nearer to reality through repetition. The main "enemy" in Vietnam is the National Liberation Front which is not going to go away or be pacified by the Saigon government no matter what happens in Cambodia. And as far as using Cambodia as a sanctuary is concerned, what reliable evidence we have suggests that it has not been anywhere near as important as U.S. spokesmen and pundits have claimed, and that the Cambodian government even under Sihanouk did its best to keep the practice to a minimum. Writing in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (February 26), a correspondent reported as follows:

To get an idea of what the situation along the border was like, I travelled into Svay Rieng province [the region of Cambodia

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closest to Saigon], sometimes to within 500 metres of the frontier. Four things seem evident—at least as far as Svay Rieng province is concerned:

- The Vietcong use Cambodian territory much less than the Americans in Saigon claim.
- US aircraft violate Cambodian air space and bomb and strafe Cambodian territory in violation of the US guidelines, frequently with no cause at all, and much more often than the US admits.
- In fairness to all sides, it is obvious that the Americans, South Vietnamese, Vietcong, and North Vietnamese are all making some degree of effort to keep the war out of Cambodia.
- The Cambodian effort to hold ground against all comers belies any reports that they have an "agreement" with the communists—or for that matter with the Americans.

The editorial writers of the *New York Times* showed themselves to be a great deal more sober and realistic than Sulzberger when they wrote a few days after the appearance of his column quoted above:

> The increased willingness of the Cambodian army under the new regime to permit allied cross-border raids against Vietnamese Communist sanctuaries undoubtedly strikes many South Vietnamese and American military men as a welcome opportunity. It opens the way to inflict more damage there on major Vietcong and North Vietnamese units, supply dumps, and headquarters. But it is also an opportunity to get bogged down on a new front that is unlikely to prove any more decisive than the battlefields already engaged. . . .
>
> With 40,000 or more Vietnamese Communist troops in Cambodia, a huge allied military operation would have to be mounted if an effort were to be made to close down the sanctuary area. Even so, success undoubtedly would prove elusive. . . .
>
> If some bases on the Cambodian side of the border could be rendered unusable, the Communist forces could move back a few miles to new bases. Or, if they felt seriously threatened in their sanctuary, they might be tempted to lend forces to Prince Sihanouk in an effort to restore him to power, a move that might bring an embarrassing request from Pnompenh for American military rescue. *Other possibilities can be imagined. They all lead not to ending the war but to widening it.* . . . (March 31. Emphasis added.)

This is certainly true as far as it goes. But it does not go far enough. What has to be understood now is that Sihanouk was the fulcrum in a precariously balanced equilibrium of forces. His removal has destroyed this equilibrium and released the

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forces which previously held each other in check. And the nature of these forces—the interests and objectives which energize them—is such that not only *may* they lead to a widening of the war, they *must* lead in that direction.

That the American and South Vietnamese military leaders want freedom to invade Cambodia is obvious. Hardly less obvious is the political interest of the Saigon government in sucking the Americans deeper into the Southeast Asian fighting. Perhaps not so obvious, at least as yet, is the fact that the new leaders in Cambodia have the same interest as the Saigon government in the deepest possible involvement of the Americans. As we saw above, they have deliberately chosen the role of U.S. satellite, which implies, in Southeast Asia even more than anywhere else in the world, becoming a military ward of the United States. As to the NLF and Hanoi, now that the old equilibrium around Sihanouk has been destroyed, their interest clearly lies in doing whatever they can to strengthen and hasten the victory of the revolutionary forces in Cambodia, as in Laos and elsewhere in the region. That these forces exist in the form of the Khmer Rouge movement is well known, though little information seems to be available on their present numbers or fighting potential. Another unknown at this stage is the future role of Sihanouk. Reports from Cambodia all agree that he was very popular in the countryside. What is unclear is whether this popularity will survive his overthrow and, if it does, whether he has the will and the ability to play a revolutionary as distinct from a conciliatory role. Historical analogies suggest a negative answer on both counts.

But in any case, speculation, even if it were well informed, on the strength of the Khmer Rouge or the possible role of Sihanouk would not go to the heart of the matter. Cambodia has been relatively sheltered from the ravages of war up to now. This immunity is coming to an end, thanks to the initiative of the Americans and/or their friends in Pnompenh. As the war spreads, the Cambodian people will be dragged into it willy-nilly and forced to take sides: either for national independence and social revolution, or for satellization and counter-revolution. It may take considerable time and experience for these issues to become clear, but when they do there is little

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reason to doubt that the mass of Cambodian people will, like the mass of Vietnamese before them, opt for independence and revolution.

When that time comes, the Americans will no doubt fervently wish the old Sihanouk were back in power in Pnompenh. But by then it will be too late. As has happened so many times before, and doubtless will happen even more times in the future, the United States, by seeking to extend its direct control, will have raised up and taught the very forces which fight back to achieve real independence. Reporting on his famous 1965 interview with Mao Tse-tung, Edgar Snow wrote:

> During our conversation he repeatedly thanked foreign invaders for speeding up the Chinese revolution and for bestowing similar favors in Southeast Asia today. . . . He observed that the more American weapons and troops brought into Saigon, the faster the South Vietnamese liberation forces would become armed and educated to win victory. (*New Republic,* February 27, 1965.)

And now it is the turn of the Cambodians to receive American favors. May they make as good use of them as have their Chinese and Vietnamese brothers.

But these are the longer-term implications of the spread of the war into Cambodia. In the short run, in fact in the very near future, the most important consequence seems likely to be a major crisis in the United States itself. Nixon has kept the lid on by pretending to have a policy of getting out of Vietnam. This illusion could perhaps be kept alive for quite a while by soothing talk and small withdrawals of U.S. forces. But there is one proviso, that things should remain relatively quiet in Vietnam and the surrounding areas. With this proviso negated by the spread of the war, at first in Laos and now into Cambodia, the illusion itself must soon dissolve. And when the American people wake up to the reality that Nixon's policy, far from aiming at withdrawal from Vietnam, is to fight what Michael Klare aptly calls "the great South Asian war,"* the U.S. political scene could well be thrown into unprecedented turmoil.

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* In an informative article in the *Nation* of March 9, 1970.

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In a speech in the Senate on April 2nd, Fulbright said that the Communists "cannot drive us out of Indochina. But they can force on us the choice of either plunging in altogether or getting out altogether." Whether or not one agrees that it is "the Communists" who are forcing this choice on us, there can be no doubt that Fulbright has accurately identified the real alternatives facing the United States in Southeast Asia. The first alternative is clearly unacceptable to the mass of Americans, the second to the U.S. ruling class. Here are the makings of a crisis of world-shaking significance.

(April 10, 1970)

"The Costaguana [a fictional Latin American country] government shall play its hand for all it's worth—and don't you forget it, Mr. Gould. Now, what is Costaguana? It is the bottomless pit of ten per cent loans and other fool investments. European capital had been flung into it with both hands for years. Not ours, though. We in this country know just about enough to keep indoors when it rains. We can sit and watch. Of course, someday we shall step in. We are bound to. But there's no hurry. Time itself has got to wait on the greatest country in the whole of God's universe. We shall be giving the word for everything: industry, trade, law, journalism, art, politics, and religion, from Cape Horn clear over to Smith's Sound, and beyond, too, if anything worth taking hold of turns up at the North Pole. And then we shall have the leisure to take in hand the outlying islands and continents of the earth. We shall run the world's business whether the world likes it or not. The world can't help it—and neither can we, I guess."

—Joseph Conrad, *Nostromo—A Tale of the Seaboard,* 1904

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PRECONDITIONS OF SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

BY GLYN HUGHES

> *. . . the deeper I enter into the cultures and the political circles the surer I am that the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology.*—Frantz Fanon.

In the last ten years more than thirty African countries south of the Sahara have regained political independence from colonial rule. These countries represent a great range of differing economic and political conditions, and any attempt to generalize from their varied experiences runs the risk of oversimplification and distortion. However, there are some common factors in these experiences—particularly the acquisition of a nominal political independence which left the colonial economic structure largely intact, the external pressures from monopoly capitalism these countries have faced, and the inherent problems of economic underdevelopment—which make some generalization possible and worthwhile. This article analyzes socio-economic developments within these countries during this "decade of Independence,"* and attempts to provide a basis from which some assessment of future trends can be made.

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* "Independence" (capitalized) is used throughout to denote nominal political independence, and does not necessarily imply real political or economic autonomy.

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Development in the Decade since Independence

The most crucial point concerning the African independence movements of the 1950s and early 1960s is that, with one or two exceptions, they were non-revolutionary. The wind of change which fanned Africa forced the imperialist powers onto another tack; it did not drive them from the continent. The few revolutionary exceptions, such as Algeria and Kenya, served as a warning to Britain, Belgium, and France at least that their interests in Africa could only be preserved by swiftly granting political independence to their colonies. Portugal, which ignored the warning, is the only imperialist power that now finds its interests seriously threatened by revolution. On the other hand, West Germany, the United States, and other capitalist powers formerly without colonial possessions in Africa, have rapidly increased their economic penetration.

The non-revolutionary nature of most of the independence movements in the ex-colonies was closely related to the character of the African nationalist parties whose leadership was invariably bourgeois or petty-bourgeois, and whose aim was limited to the attainment of political independence in the form of African majority rule. In this aim the national bourgeois leadership, the peasant masses, and the small urban proletariat were temporarily united. The colonial powers were willing to accept this union provided that guarantees of security were given to settlers and foreign commercial interests, and the colonial grip was usually still strong enough to enforce these guarantees as a condition of political independence. The case of Kenya provides a good example of this, where a precondition of Independence was the crushing of the Land Freedom Army, which represented the peasant threat to settlers' interests. Thus, on the eve of Kenyan Independence we find African nationalist leaders such as Kenyatta, Mboya, and even the "radical" Odinga denying any association with the revolutionary peasant movement, in their effort to appear respectable enough to assume the responsibilities of government.*

It is necessary at this stage to examine this African na-

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tional bourgeoisie in more detail. Fanon's description, partly prophetic at the time of writing, is tellingly accurate:

> The national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an underdeveloped middle class. . . . [It] is not engaged in production, nor invention, nor building, nor labor; it is completely canalized into activities of the intermediary type.[1]**

African national bourgeoisies are commercial and bureaucratic rather than entrepreneurial. This has an important influence on the kind of economic policies characteristic of newly independent African countries. Trade and government administration may be appropriated into national hands,*** but manufacturing and extractive industry remain largely untouched. The continued success of commerce, which involves the export of raw materials and the import of finished goods and capital goods, depends on maintaining and strengthening the trading links which were set up with the "mother country" before Independence. If, for any reason, relations with the mother country are cut, a foster mother must be found; but the basic pattern of trade is not altered. This discourages any changes in the export-oriented agricultural sector, and in many cases inhibits the commercially-minded national government from undertaking any land reform program which would seem to threaten the short-term export level.

The attainment of political independence removed the temporary unity of interest between the peasantry and the national bourgeoisie which now held power. Conflicts of interest were bound to arise. Oginga Odinga relates, for instance, the curious case of Kenya in 1964 when white settlers evicted thou-

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* In the case of Mboya and Odinga there is no reason to doubt this denial. Kenyatta, interned at the beginning of the "Emergency" in 1952, does not appear to have taken a part in preparations for armed resistance before this date. See, for instance, O. Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru*, 1967, ch. 6.

** Numbered notes will be found at the end of the article.

*** Although in a number of countries trade remains largely in the hands of ethnic minorities (such as the Asians in East Africa) who may still maintain links abroad.

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sands of squatters from their estates and destroyed their crops. A government member who took up the squatters' cause was severely reprimanded by Kenyatta for criticizing "the government's policy of discouraging illegal squatting on private property" and forced to resign. The squatters' pleas were ignored, regardless of the fact that some of them had originally lost their lands in the 1950s when they took to the forests in the struggle against the colonial government.

The relationship since Independence between the national bourgeoisie and the urban workers has not been so clear-cut. Because of its non-entrepreneurial nature, it is not automatically in the ruling group's interest to hold wages down. The upper grades of skilled and semi-skilled workers have been able to exert political pressure to raise wages. In some cases this pressure has resulted in minimum-wage legislation which has raised all urban wages to a level far above average rural earnings. To some extent, then, the interests of this labor aristocracy have been identified with the ruling national bourgeoisie. However, the gap between urban and rural living standards has drawn a restless and largely unemployed lumpenproletariat into the towns. It is the dangerous political consequences of this which have driven the ruling group to show some resistance to workers' demands. This has been done partly by appeals to the spirit of national unity, and partly by direct control of trade unions by the political parties.

The national bourgeoisie is understandably reluctant to acknowledge the existence of antagonistic class interests. This is partly a vestige of the Independence struggle, when class differences were submerged in the unifying stream of anti-colonialism. Partly, though, the national bourgeoisie realizes the danger to itself of admitting that its own rule is not in the interest of all. The myth of "classlessness" was evident even in those states which at or shortly after Independence adopted some form of "African Socialism." Leopold Senghor, for instance, denies the relevance of class analysis to post-Independence Senegalese society. His argument is that African society before the colonial

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period was "classless," and that exploitation is a purely colonial phenomenon which will disappear once political independence is regained.[2] The outlook of the Ghanaian Convention Peoples Party was similar.* This astigmatism of even progressive African leaders—"class-blindness" it might be called—is of extreme importance in understanding their post-Independence policies. First, because of their failure to understand the nature of the property relations established during the colonial period, they have seen no necessity to change the system of ownership as a precondition of economic and social progress. African Socialism is quite compatible, it seems, with private enterprise and an indigenous property-owning class. Second, African Socialists have failed to recognize the essentially exploitative nature of foreign capital investment. Thus the *Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for* 1964-1969 quotes President Nyerere on page 13: "We are committed to a philosophy of African Socialism. . . ." On page 17, however, we are told that "three quarters of industrial development capital will have to come from the private sector in Tanganyika and abroad," and that provisions will be made for "guarantees for private investment and the repatriation of capital." It is perhaps significant that African Socialism is here referred to as a "philosophy" rather than an ideology.

The fact that the national bourgeoisie lacks both capital and skill further encourages it to leave industry open to foreign capital and enterprise. Private capital is attracted for the same reasons and in the same manner now as it was in the colonial period. There is no reason to imagine that its role has changed, simply because nominal political control has shifted from a

* It is worth noting, however, that Nyerere, alone among African Socialist leaders, maintained an equivocal position. While accepting the "classlessness" of pre-colonial African society, he clearly saw the potential growth of an exploiting class in post-Independence society, and the need for the ruling party to guard against this, although he seems to have been more concerned with a class of capitalist landowners than with the bureaucracy. In fact there is some overlap between the two, since capitalist farming is one way in which the bureaucracy can consolidate its position. See Nyerere's *Ujamaa — The Basis of African Socialism,* 1962.

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colonial government to a national bourgeois oligarchy. A recent UN publication points out that "although part of the flow goes into manufacturing industries producing import substitutes, primary export industries such as mining, as well as the trade and services sector, continue to attract the bulk of the investments."[3]

The exploitative nature of foreign capital investment will be examined in more detail later. We should now turn to its effects, within the host state, on the pattern of development and its potential for long-term economic growth. Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, in an article to which I am much indebted,[4] emphasize two important characteristics of industry in the so-called developing countries. First, it is capital-intensive. This is partly because foreign capitalists tend to transfer to these countries the methods with which they are already familiar, rather than developing new labor-intensive methods. Partly also it is encouraged by the African governments themselves, which tend to perpetuate the wage and salary scales inherited from the colonial period. Rising wage rates have in turn encouraged the tendency towards capital-intensity in industry.

The second characteristic of manufacturing industry in developing countries is that it is oriented towards production of consumer goods rather than capital goods. A number of factors reinforce this tendency: first, markets for certain consumer goods already existed, and import-substitution presents obvious openings for local industry; second, since the local market is often small, foreign capitalist concerns have found insufficient incentive to invest in capital-goods industries; third, the very fact that these consumer-goods industries tend to be capital-intensive and therefore require highly sophisticated machinery inhibits the development and production of capital goods which could be produced locally.

The combined effect of this tendency towards capital-intensity and consumer-goods industries has a crucial bearing on the pattern of development. On the one hand it encourages increasing differentials in living standards between the urban and rural sectors. Wages and salaries are pushed up, enabling the

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labor aristocracy of the towns and the bourgeoisie to increase their levels of consumption, thus putting further pressure on the demand for both locally produced and imported consumer goods. On the other hand, the peasant farmers still rely on increasing their own production (especially of export cash crops) in order to enter into the world of consumer-goods consumption.* Increasing agricultural output depends partly on the vagaries of the international market (which has not, in the past decade, been particularly favorable to primary products), but it also depends on the capacity of the peasant farmers to increase production. It is precisely this capacity which is inhibited by an industrial sector oriented towards consumer-goods production. And when we speak of capital goods in relation to agriculture, we do not mean combine harvesters or even tractors, but ox-ploughs, water pumps, fertilizers, bicycles. Experience has shown the futility and waste of combining expensive and complex machines with peasant labor; yet the productivity of the peasant farmer could be vastly increased by introducing the relatively simple capital equipment which would be well within the capacity of the country to produce.[5]

Briefly then, foreign consumer-goods industry has tended to aggravate the town-country problem and, insofar as it has tied the growth of the agricultural sector to the increase in demand for export crops, has ensured a stagnant or falling standard of living for the mass of the peasantry. This does not portend well for future industrial development either. The expansion of industry in recent years has owed a lot to import-substitution, but the opportunities here are diminishing, and future expansion must depend on the growth rate of the internal market. If this market (at least in the agricultural sector) remains stagnant, many African countries will face a fall in their industrial growth

* Insofar as local consumer-goods industries use local raw materials, demand for peasant cash crops would be increased, but this is *not* often the case. Ubiquitous Coca-Cola factories, for instance, continue to import flavoring essence, even when local fruits that could be used for soft drinks abound. Foreign investors have no reason to make a point of using local raw materials.

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rates over the next few years.

It is true that in the short run some quite spectacular industrial growth has been achieved in light industry through import-substitution. Factories producing beer, cigarettes, shoes, matches, and so on, have sprung up to supply already existing markets, and give the impression of growth. But this limited growth in one sector (implying, of course, a corresponding growth in foreign-investment earnings) is not matched by other sectors of the economy—especially agriculture, which continues to rely on a combination of some large-scale, foreign-owned enterprises and a large number of inefficient peasant small-holdings. In some cases, where for instance foreign companies or settlers withdraw, there may be a decline in output if the estates are divided up into small-holdings or taken over by relatively inefficient local entrepreneurs.

The experience of the underdeveloped regions of Africa during the 1960s has been largely one of economic stagnation. Table 1 indicates that in nearly two fifths of the area between 1960 and 1966, Gross Domestic Product per capita was growing at an annual rate of less than 1 percent. Even this may be an optimistic view if we take into account the generally adverse movement in the terms of trade for primary producing countries in this period. That is to say, if a large part of the domestic product is exported, which is generally so in the ex-colonies, and if these (primary) goods are being exchanged for an ever smaller quantity of (manufactured) imports, then the increase in real national income is diminished by this amount. It has been calculated for East Africa that the adverse movement in the terms of trade has been of the order of 3 percent per annum, and since rather more than one third of the domestic product is exported, this would indicate a decrease in the value of the national product of around 1 percent per annum.[6] If this is the experience of other African countries also, the proportion of "developing" Africa for which output per head is growing at less than 1 percent per annum would be around 70 percent rather than the 40 percent indicated in Table 1.

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TABLE 1
RATES OF GROWTH OF GDP PER HEAD IN DEVELOPING AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1960-66

Rates of growth (average % p.a.)	*Number of countries*	*% of population of developing Africa*
Negative	13	22.0
0 — 0.9	6	17.4
1.0 — 1.9	9	33.1
2.0 — 2.9	5	12.6
3.0 — 3.9	5	12.3
4.0 — 4.9	0	0
5.0 +	4	2.6

Source: *Economic Conditions in Africa in Recent Years,* UN, 1968, p. 17.

At any rate, this is enough to indicate that the gleaming new factories and office blocks of Abidjan, Lagos, and Nairobi are deceptive indices of economic progress. Allowing further for the great personal-income inequalities in Africa, the truth is that for the peasant masses of the continent, incomes have stagnated or declined during the decade of Independence.

The Preconditions for Economic Development

The central problem in the economic development of African countries is the creation of economic surplus and its allocation to productive investment. This is not purely an economic problem, however, but rather politico-economic, since the creation of economic surplus and the use to which it is put depend on the dominant political forces within the society.

Bourgeois economists tend to view the problem with some despondency. They argue that investment resources* can be increased in three ways: (a) by increasing exports, (b) by increasing domestic savings, and (c) by an inflow of foreign aid and investment. But, it is pointed out, increasing the volume of exports may be self-defeating, since it leads to lower prices; and insofar as the privilege of supplying the developed coun-

* This term is not of course synonymous with "economic surplus" as used by socialist economists, but since the level of investment resources is partly determined by the economic surplus, the distinction is not crucial in this context.

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tries with raw materials has already been rationed out through quota systems and bilateral agreements, this may in fact be a non-option. Similarly, domestic savings can hardly be increased when the majority of personal incomes are so low. To be sure, feudal plutocracies, where they exist, are fair game for the bourgeois economist, but he is reluctant to press his demands too hard on the business sector for fear of damaging "incentives." This leaves us with foreign aid, and here our economist waxes indignant at the niggardliness of the rich countries, exhorts them in the name of humanity to allocate even 1 percent of their wealth to their poorer brothers, and ends with a vague threat of retribution by the Third World if something is not done soon.

But even if developed countries increased foreign aid to 2 percent or even 3 percent of their national product (reversing, incidentally, the present trend by which aid is growing more slowly than donor nations' national product), two conditions would have to be met for it to result in long-term growth for the underdeveloped countries. First, the aid would have to be in the form of direct grants or soft loans. Yet no one seriously envisages the capitalist industrial powers transforming themselves into charity organizations. Secondly, the political and economic structure of the receiving countries would have to be such as to make long-term economic growth possible. In very few underdeveloped countries is this condition at present fulfilled, and the countries which come near to fulfilling it are precisely those which are not going to receive a massive input of aid from the West.

A socialist approach to economic growth in underdeveloped countries must center on the problem of economic surplus rather than foreign aid or exports, and this in turn requires an examination of two interrelated factors. The first is the "latent surplus" of the agricultural sector. The low productivity of peasant agriculture, resulting from its primitive methods and small-scale nature, coupled with large tracts of underutilized land in many African countries, indicate that the agricultural

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sector is capable of vastly increasing its output. We have already seen that agricultural expansion depends in part on the establishment of local capital-goods industry. We have also seen that the continued expansion of consumer-goods industry depends on an increasing demand from the agricultural sector for consumer goods. And, conversely, some of the incentive for peasant farmers to increase their output above subsistence level must come from the production of consumer goods. There are other factors which will affect development in the agricultural sector, and it is beyond the scope of this article to consider them in detail. But possibly the most important is the way in which agricultural production is to be organized. While it is true that the individual peasant holding has in most cases the potential for a greater output, it would soon reach a ceiling. Further increases can only be obtained by creating larger units of production. The form that these would take must depend largely on local conditions, and even within the same country one can envisage collectives, co-operatives, or state farms, for instance, proving suitable for different regions or crops. Interesting possibilities are raised by the Tanzanian experiment of "*ujamaa* villages" in which production is being organized partly collectively and partly individually, but where overall planning and organization is in the hands of the community itself. But it must be stressed that no system of agricultural organization will produce the hoped for, long-term development except in the context of a general economic strategy as considered above, which will take into account the interaction between the agricultural and industrial sectors.

It has been argued, even by some socialists, that the reorganization of the peasant sector can best be left to market forces and the emergence of capitalist farmers from among the ranks of wealthier peasants. This development is already evident in most African countries to a greater or lesser extent. But it seems hard to see how this could be a serious option for a country intent on socialist development. The point has been well put by Nyerere:

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If this kind of capitalist development takes place widely over the country, we may get a good statistical increase in the national wealth of Tanzania, but the masses of the people will not necessarily be better off. On the contrary, as land becomes more scarce we shall find ourselves with a farmers' class and a laborers' class, with the latter being unable either to work for themselves or to receive a full return for the contribution they are making to the total output. They will become a "rural proletariat" depending on the decisions of other men for their existence, and subject in consequence to all the subservience, social and economic inequality, and insecurity which such a position involves.[7]

The absurdity of deliberately creating a capitalist class so that at some time in the future its wealth can be expropriated hardly deserves further attention.

The second factor which must be examined in relation to the economic development of African countries is what we might call "hidden surplus," that is to say, resources which are put to wasteful or unproductive uses. Five main types of hidden surplus can be identified: (1) high consumption levels, particularly of imports, of the national bourgeoisie and labor aristocracy, (2) investment in both the public and private sectors in "prestige" projects and luxury housing, (3) remittances abroad of expatriates' salaries and pensions, (4) public debt service on foreign loans, (5) net outflow of foreign investment earnings.

Each of these will be dealt with in turn, an attempt being made where possible to arrive at some quantitative assessment of their significance for economic development. By the very nature of the statistics available it is impossible to arrive at exact values. The calculations which follow are estimates only, whose purpose is to establish the rough order of magnitude of the concepts we are dealing with in order to assess their significance. These forms of economic waste appear to be to a greater or lesser extent inseparable from the period of national bourgeois rule which most African countries are experiencing at the moment. Two questions, then, face us. What would be the effect on economic development if these resources were put

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to effective use? And in what circumstances *could* this misallocation of resources be rectified?

(1) The salary scales which the national bourgeoisie happily took over from its colonial masters have encouraged high consumer demand from this class, especially since the national bourgeoisie, with its bureaucratic rather than entrepreneurial interests, tends to put consumption before saving. This tendency is reinforced by strong social pressures, especially towards consumer durables. The cars outside the senior civil servants' houses get larger and shinier, and the government clerk, taking note, puts down his first payment on a scooter. A significant proportion of this demand for consumer goods is for imports. Table 2 (p. 24) shows the commodity composition of imports of developing Africa in 1960 and 1964. Perhaps the most revealing figures here indicate that these African countries, with economies based largely on agriculture, spend about one fifth of their import bill on food, drink, and tobacco! And the proportion in 1964 had risen slightly since 1960. Some of this, of course, represents trade between the underdeveloped countries themselves, but this is not the major part. In 1964, for instance, 66 percent of these imports of food, drink, and tobacco came from developed capitalist countries.[8]

Any attempt to distinguish between "essential" and "non-essential" imports must be arbitrary, since the use of the commodity may be as relevant as the type. Light planes can be used for executive joyrides or crop-spraying. In each of the commodity categories in Table 2 some non-essential imports could be found. However, national bourgeois consumption is most significant in the categories "food, beverages, and tobacco" and "other manufactures," with the addition of a considerable expenditure on private road vehicles which would be included under "machinery and transport equipment." Ignoring the effects of all bourgeois consumption on the other categories, it is possible to make a very conservative quantitative assessment in these three fields alone to discover whether bourgeois import consumption is large enough to form a significant

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TABLE 2
COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS OF DEVELOPING AFRICA*
(*Thousands of U.S. dollars*)

	1960	*%*	*1964*	*%*
Food, beverages, & tobacco	1,137,840	17.8	1,441,170	20.2
Basic materials	277,995	4.3	358,500	5.0
Mineral fuels	471,945	7.4	509,070	7.1
Chemicals	465,480	7.3	552,090	7.8
Textiles	678,825	10.6	666,810	9.4
Metals	633,570	9.9	731,340	10.3
Machinery & transport equipment	1,622,715	25.3	1,849,860	26.0
Other manufactures	1,121,630	17.5	1,011,160	14.2
Total Imports	6,410,00		7,120,000	

* Excluding South Africa.

Source: *A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa,* UN, 1968, p. 143.

drain on potential investment resources. We have noted that, in the first category, two thirds of the imports were from developed capitalist countries: this is equivalent to 13.5 percent of all imports in 1964, or $961 million. A detailed examination of six countries indicated that passenger cars and spare parts (but not fuel) comprise around 5 percent of total imports; while at a conservative estimate one third of "other manufactures"—4.5 percent of total imports in 1964—could be classified as non-essential. These three import categories alone, therefore, would together constitute 23 percent of total imports, or $1.64 billion in 1964. This sum is nearly equal to all official bilateral and multilateral aid received by developing Africa ($1.72 billion) in the same year.

(2) It is not possible to calculate with any precision the investment resources which are wasted in luxury housing and prestige building projects. Governments are major offenders: airports, universities, conference halls, superhighways are often built on a needlessly lavish scale for use by a minute section of the population. In the private sector, the expansion of the towns and growing demand for offices and living accommoda-

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tions provide practically risk-free investment opportunities with a high return, particularly attractive to a non-entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. The duplication of resources inherent in capitalist economies accounts for another form of waste: the familiar phenomenon of the "one gas-station town" with three gas stations (often selling, in fierce competition, three brands of gasoline from the same refinery). At any rate, building construction forms a high proportion of capital accumulation in African countries, and a subjective view would indicate that a significant proportion of this is waste.

(3) Insofar as expatriates employed in Africa set the pattern of bourgeois consumption, their effect on imports is similar to that of the national bourgeoisie. But they are responsible for a further drain in the form of salary remittances and pension payments to their own countries. The few figures that are available indicate that salary remittances are astonishingly large. "These remittances do not only constitute a drain on foreign exchange earnings of African countries, but substantially reduce the funds available for domestic investment."[9] How "substantial" is this drain? The same UN publication from which that quotation is taken gives figures for fourteen countries between 1959 and 1962. The 393,435 expatriates living in these countries remitted portions of their incomes varying from 10.7 percent (Sudan) to 47.4 percent (Gabon) and totalling $117 million.[10] This sum represented 0.8 percent of the GDP's of these fourteen countries.* Applying the same proportion to developing Africa as a whole would give us an estimate for expatriate remittances of around $0.22 billion for 1961. This does not include pension payments to ex-colonial officers, which many African countries generously maintain.

(4) The rapid increase in Africa's public debt in recent years, mostly through foreign loans, has frequently been commented upon. In seven selected countries between 1955 and

* For some countries the proportion was much higher. In Gabon, for instance in 1961 the 5,220 expatriates sent home 13 percent of the country's GDP!

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1962, public debt doubled from $0.7 billion to $1.4 billion.[11] But whereas total debt increased by 100 percent in these countries, debt service rose by nearly 400 percent, from $37 million to $143 million. The fast increase in debt service was due mainly to amortization (repayment) of loans, which has been rising faster than interest payments, due to the short-term nature of much foreign lending. There is evidence that this trend is continuing. By 1965 total outstanding public debt for developing Africa had reached $5 billion, and in 1964 and 1965 annual debt-service payments amounted to $0.3 billion.

(5) Aggregate outflow of foreign investment income from developing Africa is hard to assess, although, as Arrighi and Saul point out: "It seems a well-established fact that foreign private investment in less developed economies (far from being an outlet for a domestically created surplus) has been, in the recent past, an efficient device for transferring surplus generated abroad to the advanced capitalist countries."[12] They quote, for instance, data derived from U.S. Department of Commerce statistics indicating that in the years 1959-1964, U.S. direct investments (excluding oil) in Africa amounted to $386 million and investment income to $610 million. Profits are certainly high. "Since net returns of 15 to 20 percent on the equity before tax are not abnormal for new investment in developed countries, foreign investors expect to earn more than this on equity investment in developing areas."[13]

There has been a sharp increase in recent years in the invisible payments section of most African countries' balance of payments, and the largest component of the deficit in the invisibles' account has been interest and dividend payments on foreign private investment.[14] A study of eight countries revealed that net outflow of private investment earnings in 1963 totalled $200 million, which was equivalent to 8 percent of their export earnings.[15] Applying the same proportion to developing African countries as a whole, we can estimate that total net outflow of private investment earnings was approximately 1.76 percent of GDP in 1963, or $0.51 billion.

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TABLE 3

ESTIMATES OF RESOURCE WASTAGE IN DEVELOPING AFRICAN COUNTRIES*

		% of GDP	*U.S.$ billions*
1)	Non-essential imports (1964)	5.22	1.64
2)	Local "prestige" investment	n.a.	n.a.
3)	Expatriate salary remittances (1961)	0.8	0.22
4)	Public debt service (1964)	0.95	0.3
5)	Net outflow of foreign investment earnings (1963)	1.76	0.51
	Total	8.73	2.67

* Excludes South Africa. n.a = not available.

Table 3 summarizes our findings. It is again stressed that the figures are rough estimates only, although the figure of 8.73 percent of GDP is almost certainly an underestimate of total resource wastage, since it excludes any allowance for item 2, and item 1 includes estimates for only three categories of imports. This could then be taken as a minimum estimate.

How significant are these totals? Table 4 shows the composition of the GDP of developing African countries between 1960 and 1964. The important figures are those for capital formation, which stood at about 16 percent of GDP during this period.

TABLE 4

GDP OF DEVELOPING AFRICAN COUNTRIES 1960-1964[a]

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*
GDP (U.S.$ billions)[b]	27.11	27.64	27.96	29.25	31.39
Capital Formation as % of GDP	16.6	16.3	14.7	15.1	16.0
Consumption as % of GDP	90.0	90.0	89.7	88.5	87.6
Exports as % of GDP	19.9	19.7	20.9	22.1	24.3
Less: Imports as % of GDP	-26.5	-26.1	-25.3	-25.7	-28.0

[a] Excluding South Africa.
[b] At 1960 constant prices.

Source: *A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa*, 1968, UN, pp. 22, 28.

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Economists generally agree that this figure of 16 percent is much too low, and that one condition for even a moderate growth rate must be for capital formation to be increased to at least 25 percent of GDP. What now becomes obvious is that these economies are perfectly capable of raising their capital formation to at least this level by employing some of the "hidden" surplus which is at present being unproductively used. The 8.7 percent of GDP which has been calculated as a minimum estimate would alone be sufficient to do this. There is, in fact, a way off the economic treadmill, without the intervention of massive foreign charity or some other *deus ex machina.*

Future Prospects

The economies of underdeveloped African countries in recent years have been subject to minimal growth rates, and standards of living for the mass of Africans have stagnated. This is the price of national bourgeois rule and the links which this class is forced to maintain with international monopoly capitalism. The instability of African governments in the decade since Independence is an indication of their failure to cope with the problem of economic development; but games of musical chairs among national bourgeois political parties, military juntas, or dictators do not touch the root of the problem, which is the survival of economic and class structures inherited from the colonial period and perpetuated by the present ruling elites.

The outlook is not bright. In the context of present-day Africa there seems nothing to prevent the national bourgeoisie *as a class* from maintaining power in any country so long as it is consciously and cynically determined to do so. It controls (with the consent of the dominant imperialist powers) the army, police, administration, and mass media. Its potential enemies are weak: the peasantry remains unorganized and at a low level of political consciousness, while the urban proletariat is small and divided. Any hope for socialist development in Africa must lie in two directions: first, with the new independent states

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that will emerge from the wars of liberation in Southern Africa, where the revolutionary struggle appears to be molding socialist aspirations; and second, among the few national bourgeois governments which at present seem to be seriously looking for a socialist path of development.

The latter need not be a contradiction in terms. Ever since the 1950s socialists in and outside Africa have looked to the possibility of socialist development through small, radical, politically conscious leadership groups. So far these hopes have been disappointed. But it is now possible to assess the causes of failure of African socialist movements such as Nkrumah's in Ghana. The main cause lies in the extreme vulnerability of a national bourgeois government which attempts, in Fanon's words, to "betray its own class" and yet fails at the same time to establish a firm base of popular support. Progressive African governments are elites in search of a revolutionary class. Only now are some of them beginning to realize what is entailed in a betrayal of the interests of the national bourgeoisie, since they are only now beginning to recognize the existence of such a class and its links with private ownership and foreign capitalist interests.

The task of the radical national leadership is twofold. On the one hand it must cut the ties with international monopoly capitalism, which stunt economic growth and maintain dependence on foreign interests hostile to independent development. On the other hand it must swiftly create the conditions in which political and economic power is transferred from the national bourgeoisie to the mass of the people, that is, the peasantry and urban proletariat. This is particularly urgent in the case of the army and police force, which, since the colonial period, have tended to remain strongholds of the national bourgeoisie. The constant threat exists of an alliance between elements of the national bourgeoisie, the military, and foreign capitalist interests—which will upset the delicate balance of power against the radical leadership before a popular base can be built. Political mobilization of the peasantry and rationalization

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of peasant agriculture, mass literacy, nationalization and worker control of industry, organization of a people's militia, reorganization of the regular army and police force, eradication of elitist tendencies in the educational system, expropriation of the national bourgeoisie, and redeployment of resources into productive investment—these are some of the momentous tasks facing the African country intent on a socialist form of development. The task is formidable and success uncertain, since at any moment progress can be halted by a reactionary alliance of hostile forces. But success in even one country would provide a living example to the continent as a whole of the alternative to continued stagnation and crippling dependence on the capitalist world.

NOTES

1. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Penguin edition, 1961), pp. 119-120.
2. L. Senghor, "Senegalese Socialism," in *On African Socialism* (Praeger, 1964), p. 143.
3. *Bulletin for Africa,* vol. 6, no. 2, UN.
4. Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development," *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* (1968), vol. 6, no. 2. A condensation of this article, made by the authors, appeared in the May 1969 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW.
5. See, for instance, René Dumont, *False Start in Africa,* (1967).
6. P. Ndegwa and B. van Arkadie, "Future Trade, Balance of Payments and Aid Requirements," in *Problems of Foreign Aid* (Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 112.
7. J. K. Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development," in *Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism* (Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 168.
8. *A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa,* 1968, UN, p. 143.
9. *Ibid.,* p. 156.
10. *Ibid.,* pp. 161-162.
11. Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Nigeria, Sudan. These and subsequent figures are from *Economic Bulletin for Africa,* vol. 6, no. 2, UN.
12. Arrighi and Saul, *op cit.,* p. 149.
13. *Economic Bulletin for Africa,* vol. 7, nos. 1 & 2, UN, pp. 15-16.
14. *Economic Bulletin for Africa,* vol. 6, no. 2, UN, p. 12.
15. *Ibid.,* p. 30. The countries were Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia.

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THE STRUGGLE AT SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

BY KATHLEEN GOUGH

The Political Science, Sociology, and Anthropology Department (PSA) at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, British Columbia, went on strike on September 24, 1969. The strike protested the crippling of the department and its programs the previous summer. In July the SFU administration had disbanded PSA's elected committees of students and faculty, removed its chairman on unsubstantiated charges of "administrative inadequacy," and placed the department under a trusteeship of six professors, five of them from other fields. In August four PSA professors—including two well-established seniors—were dropped as of 1970 or 1971, having been unequivocally refused tenured appointments or renewal of their existing contracts. Three other faculty members received peculiar, conditional one-year renewals, and three more were refused tenure or overdue promotions, without definite notice to quit. PSA students and faculty read these acts as an unmistakable effort to crush the department's experimental teaching programs and to purge or discourage its more outspoken professors. When the department's scholarly achievements and its fate regarding renewals were compared with those in other departments at Simon Fraser, this was, indeed, the only reasonable conclusion to draw.

Today PSA is smashed. The strike by eight of the depart-

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ment's professors, most of its 1,700 students, and several hundred supporting students from other departments, lasted six weeks—the longest in a North American university except for last year's strike at San Francisco State. Its modest demands were to restore the department to normal functioning under its chairman and to negotiate new contracts for the professors. These met with a blank refusal from President Kenneth Strand. Instead, on October 3rd, he locked out the striking faculty by suspending them and cancelling their courses, thus ensuring that their students could not receive instruction in those courses for the rest of the semester. The President then initiated dismissal proceedings against the suspended faculty for failing to teach the prescribed course content in the prescribed times and places during seven working days. The eight suspended professors will probably be in fact dismissed by the Board of Governors at the end of their dismissal hearings before faculty boards during 1970. Two other PSA faculty, who were absent on leave in the fall semester, already have their contracts terminated this summer. In December, twelve teaching assistants were summarily fired by the PSA rump department of six "scab" professors for their part in the strike. The purge is one of the biggest in a North American university since McCarthy days.* It has taken place in a Canadian city just north of the U.S. border, under a President and Dean of Arts who are U.S. citizens, and in a department viewed with hope and enthusiasm by dozens of radical social scientists and hundreds of students. The lesson is one we should learn from, rather than merely lament.

For historical reasons, the PSA Department of 21 faculty contained a majority of New Left radicals and left liberals. Most had been attracted there by T.B. Bottomore, a sociologist and translator of Marx, who founded the department at the

* Since these events San Francisco State University has moved to fire 21 non-tenure faculty members for their support of last year's demands for open Third World admissions policies and a Black Studies department; and Loyola University in Montreal is proposing to phase out twenty-seven professors who supported student demands for the retention of nuclear physicist S. A. Santhanam. A large number of individual, radically oriented professors are being dropped from their appointments in North American universities this year.

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opening of the university in 1965. Bottomore, a Marxologist and Fabian rather than a Marxist, found himself opposed to the fundamental criticisms of imperialist society and its universities put forward by his junior colleagues and students and to their attempts to link theory with action. He left in December 1967 after disputes with both a reactionary administration and his subordinates. He remained, however, on paper a part-time faculty member; and later, by condemning the department publicly and accepting the role of a trustee *in absentia,* he helped bring about its destruction.

In the summer of 1968, a palace revolt by younger, mainly American, faculty leaders caused a tradition-oriented Canadian President to be dismissed and replaced by a U.S. economist and labor relations expert. During a temporary power vacuum in July 1968, in which clamors for faculty self-government and student participation filled the air at Simon Fraser, PSA teachers and students seized a chance to democratize their department and to explore radical approaches to teaching and learning. On paper, the changes of departmental structure were minor. An elected chairman replaced a British-style appointed head. Committees were elected by and from the department's professors to make recommendations to the university administration on hiring, curriculum, budget, teaching methods, contracts, and salaries.

More daring, but well within the university's current rhetoric about student participation, PSA students formed a plenum of the undergraduates enrolled in classes in the department, plus the thirty-odd graduate students, most of whom were teaching assistants. Together, the department's student and faculty plenums worked out a system of "parity." The student plenum elected committees parallel to those of the faculty, with equal powers to initiate proposals. In any pair of committees, neither could pass on a major proposal without discussion and a majority vote within the plenum from which it was drawn. Disagreements between the paired committees or between the two plenums were settled through negotiations, compromise proposals and, if necessary, prolonged discussion. Neither plenum could initiate policy against the veto of the other.

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Most horrifying to the university at large, PSA opened all its meetings and files to interested members of the university, including students. Files had previously been open only to members of the administration, privileged secretaries, heads of departments, appointed committees of senior faculty, and in some cases the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. To open them for inspection and discussion by junior faculty and students was viewed as an act of terrorism by senior professors and deans. There was, however (as in most important university conventions) no law against it, and after some initial shocks the system worked with increased goodwill and honesty for over a year.

PSA teachers and students embarked on these changes with different expectations, depending on their previous experiences and theories. Most saw them as an interesting but modest experiment designed to make life more human and learning more serious. They seemed likely, perhaps, to provoke opposition from the die-hards, but unlikely to bring on the holocaust. Personally, however, from the time that PSA professors handed equal powers to the student plenum, I felt certain that, as a community, the department's days were numbered. Without foreseeing the extraordinary series of plots, demarches, and barrages the administration would engage in, I thought the department would somehow be liquidated within a year or two.

This was because our structural changes, although reformist and constitutional, had a revolutionary content and had, from the outset, offended people in power. They meant, of course, government (or more correctly, recommendation) from below rather than from above. They changed the department from a secretly governed cell within an elitist educational club into a people's learning community. Because of the values of its elected officers, and of those who elected them, the community owed allegiance to and served, potentially if not yet actually, dispossessed and oppressed people, both locally and throughout the world. PSA's changes robbed senior professors and administrators of that aura of wisdom which flows so convincingly from esoteric and arbitrary power, and compelled

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them to argue about their decisions, values, theories and goals. In this process PSA created a mostly joyful, sometimes conflictful, and occasionally hilarious community effort where before had been a complex of individual, often alienating and competitive work-stints. After twenty-six years around North American and British universities I thought it unlikely such strides toward freedom could be made without awful combat.

Mordecai Briemberg, PSA's former chairman, has analyzed the events of the PSA experiment and of its destruction.* I shall focus on the contradictions that arose in the minds and roles of teachers who undertook the PSA experiment, and between these teachers and those who opposed them—chiefly administrators, faculty leaders, press, and business elites in Vancouver, and a small number of personally ambitious students. One purpose is to trace some of the implications of a radical social science when its practitioners act to modify their relationships in accordance with their theories. This may be useful for other students and young teachers who hope to link theory with practice in their own universities but have not had PSA's unusual, if temporary, opportunities. The other purpose is to point out the limited power of professors to pursue radical themes and goals in their work and relationships, and to suggest that repression of such teachers is increasing. Many may therefore have to use their talents outside the universities, and the question is where.

Although not clearly stated at the outset, PSA's goals were three:

(1) To present to students, and further develop with them, a radical analysis of world society, especially those segments about which we had special knowledge through our professions. I use "radical" in its broadest sense of going to the root of significant social problems. These included the character, development, and effects of imperialism in Third World coun-

* Mordecai Briemberg, "A Taste of Better Things," in *This Magazine Is About Schools,* (Toronto: January 1970). Details of the PSA case are available in a PSA document, *Who Broke Contract With Whom?* available from Ace Hollibaugh, student, PSA Department, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby 2, B.C., Canada.

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tries; the roots of underdevelopment; the sources and comparative history of revolutionary movements and movements of protest and reform; the analysis of classes and class conflict in industrial capitalist, subjugated capitalist, and socialist societies; the history of modern racism and of struggles against it by colonized peoples both inside and outside metropolitan industrial nations; the subordination of women in history and social evolution; and the sources of such evils as modern genocide, poverty, population problems, environmental destruction and pollution, and war.

While teaching from, and fulfilling the requirements of, an already-constructed course-catalogue, we increasingly focused our lectures around such themes. Four or five teachers worked from one or another adaptation of a Marxist perspective. Others began with "liberal" assumptions and questions. All viewed and deepened their analyses as the year progressed. For the teachers the purpose of this work was simply to understand, more deeply, the modern world and its antecedents, and to help open up this experience for their students, so that wherever they went afterwards, they might comprehend society and their place in it better, and better struggle to improve it. This was quite different from the usual effect, if not the aim, of university education, which produces narrowly trained and conditioned individuals willing to fill niches in corporate society with minimal protest.

(2) We tried to change the relationships among teachers, students, and secretaries from a hierarchical structure of command, obedience, and selective individual reward or punishment, into a democratic, learning-and-service community which was self-governing with respect to its internal work and relationships. The impetus for this effort came from students' sense of the failure of university education to meet their needs. It also came from their desire to share in decisions that affected their own lives immediately, rather than sometime later, or never at all. Finally, parity came from a belief held by large numbers of students and PSA faculty that, despite differences in knowledge and experience, teaching and learning are best accomplished as a two-way process requiring discussion and argument rather than coercion and obedience.

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Since the strike failed, PSA has often been accused of going too far and too fast in egalitarianism; of trying to create a little hot-house democracy too "far out" to relate realistically to the rest of the university and to British Columbia. This may be true. Most of the teachers and many senior students were cosmopolites and radical or liberal nomads, veterans of anti-colonial struggles in the Commonwealth or of anti-racist, anti-war, and free-speech battles in the United States. Only six of the twenty-eight professors who entered the department from its founding in 1965 were Canadians. The rest were U.S., British, South African, German, Latin American, or Asian citizens. Graduate students had a similar spread. Few were sensitized to British Columbia's particular brand of provincial reaction or knew at first how to seek allies in the city—a city located at the bottom of a mountain on which SFU stood in lofty isolation. At the time, however, a fairly sudden shift to equality and solidarity was essential to push through the educational changes on which students and teachers were bent. Indeed, the goals of research were seriously questioned only after student parity was instituted, in the fall of 1968, under insistent student pressure for discussion of knowledge not only "for what?" but "for whom?"

(3) Third and last, many students and some faculty began to relate themselves and their work to the struggles of oppressed people already or potentially on the move in our own society or in societies with which we had contact. Such moves had been made by individuals and small groups in extra-curricular ways before parity was instituted. Thus, many were already involved in anti-war demonstrations, aid to American deserters and draft resisters, and California grape-boycotts. PSA people were influential in forming a women's caucus and a children's co-op in the summer of 1968. But during the winter and spring following, some students and teachers began to focus their research on problems of women's liberation, on the economic and power structures of British Columbia and Canada, the history and class systems of the B.C. Chinese and Canadian Indian communities, or on the B.C. school system and its relations to racial and class discrimination. In January 1969 two groups crystallized around opposed views of the

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priorities for Western intellectuals in the struggle against imperialism. One, the Vancouver Labor Forum, brought together students, teachers, and industrial workers in a downtown effort to explore research around problems of Canadian trades unions and unemployment. The other, the African Relief Services, began research and action to aid revolutionary movements in Africa. These two groups, or their successors, together with the women's caucus, spread beyond and survived the smashing of the department.

By the summer of 1968 most PSA teachers had seen that the ideal of value-free social science in which they had been educated was a myth. They vaguely saw that the structure of their work relations and the conventions of social science encouraged them to uphold or at least not seriously challenge the existing society. The experience of parity, however, helped reveal to teachers ways in which they had been actively serving the ruling class of imperialism and helping to perpetuate anachronistic and harmful features of capitalist relationships. To try to move against this trend and to infuse the beginnings of a socialist consciousness into one's work and relationships inevitably involved struggle against, and reprisals by, university and other authorities, even when these were not deliberately sought. As long as he fulfilled the "normal" requirements of his employment, these efforts also involved the teacher in acute contradictions in his own roles.

As professors of Asian, African, or Latin American studies, for example, some PSA faculty were encouraged to involve themselves and the department in applications for research grants or the funding of area study programs from American or Canadian foundations which used funds derived from the interest on loans to Third World countries, or profits on investment, much of it foreign. My own research on Indian politics and economics convinced me that in the case of agencies for research in India, these funds often came indirectly from the labor or the privation of poverty-stricken Indians. The kinds of research sponsored through them (even when not actually funded by the Department of Defense or the CIA) tended to promote counter-revolutionary theories and programs. At best, such large-scale Western-dominated research

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involved cultural imperialism and stifled the development of independent indigenous work. At worst, some of the research institutes set up were used as spy-stations by the Central Intelligence Agency.* Naturally, we had to explain such matters to students, refuse involvement in projects which seemed compromising, and, in classes, communicate with evidence our conclusion that in many Third World countries only socialist revolution could redeem the people from their poverty and underemployment. PSA was smashed before this area of concern reached open crisis. Already, however, we had incurred the enmity of at least one senior Asian professor in our own department. We were also becoming worried about how or whether to encourage our own graduate students to research in Third World countries *without* foundation research grants. Eventually, students' questions even forced some of us to wonder about the value-priorities which led us to continue in foreign area research when we might perhaps be of more use to the radical movement and the Canadian people in our country of residence.

At Halloween in 1966 a minor riot of high-school students occurred in a Vancouver suburb. The Board of Education and the government made a grant through the PSA department to four faculty members to investigate the sources of teen-age frustration. The research involved questionnaires administered to school students and parents by PSA student assistants. The forms included questions about patterns of conventionally forbidden or illegal behavior involving drug use and sexuality. In the fall of 1968 an attack was written on the project by a graduate student who had earlier been involved in it, and was presented to a PSA seminar on "Knowledge for Whom?" Criticism centered around the fact that student respondents had thought their replies were anonymous, whereas they were actually numbered and linked to names and parents' names by the researchers. By this minor subterfuge researchers had gained

* See A. Sinha, *U.S. Threat to India's Sovereignty* (Calcutta, 1964), and for similar information on Africa, *African Studies in America; the Extended Family,* by the Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Mass. See also Gerald D. Berreman, "Academic Colonialism: Not So Innocent Abroad," *The Nation* (November 10, 1969), pp. 505-508.

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possession of facts which, if revealed, could have endangered individual students in their relations with police or educational authorities, even though the researchers had no intention of using, and did not use, the information to this end. Further complaints were that a private report was to be written for the Board of Education before the materials could be re-collated for publication. Again, the researchers made no effort to communicate their conclusions to students or to help students, although the latter were seen as in some respects powerless and exploited people, at the mercy of a conservative educational system. Finally, no study was made of the power-structure and values of the school teachers, administrators, and business community against which some students appeared to be reacting. Faculty still involved in the project refused to expand or modify its terms of reference, but the department decided not to sponsor such projects again. This was not calculated to endear PSA to educational authorities and local elites, even though it was impossible for the department to prevent individual professors from undertaking more of such contract research.

Student parity at the committee level cast a searchlight on faculty authority in the classroom and brought into focus professors' continuing obligation to grade students' academic performance. In the beginning, PSA professors saw grades as a necessary if unpleasant part of evaluating learning, or at worst a nuisance. Later they came to feel that individual grading of students partly destroyed or made hypocritical their efforts to exchange ideas freely, to help the neediest students, to undercut competition and enhance collective learning, welfare, and consciousness, and to promote a critical social science. These problems grew worse when the administration pressed us to grade more strictly, to grade on a "curve," and to fail a given proportion of students. In fact, PSA's intensive interchange in small tutorials, together with students' interest in the subjects they chose, had, in my opinion, so raised the quality of their work that it was hard by conventional standards to give low grades to most of the work being produced in our department. Our relatively high grades were, however, interpreted by administrators as evidence of "low standards," and threats were

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repeatedly made to investigate and deal with the department's alleged "academic incompetence." The virtual requirement that we fail or punish a certain proportion of each class every semester made a mockery of our efforts to engage and encourage every student and to form group research projects, so that the cultural and intellectual level of all might be raised. Anxiety about grades caused many students who would otherwise have been interested in group research and sharing knowledge to work competitively against their peers in an effort to obtain a good job or a place in graduate school. If we used conventional standards, the students to whom we felt obliged to give lower grades were often students from Third World, rural, or poor urban backgrounds or from ethnic minorities, whose English skills were less developed or who had grown up with few books around them. Yet these were precisely the students we most wanted to interest in our critique of imperialism. To interest and then to penalize students for incomplete understanding or linguistic inadequacy seemed a cruel waste. Such students were also most often those whose time for their studies was limited by the need to work for a living. Further complications arose because of the radical and experimental content of much of our work. Some ambitious students who gained high grades from other professors because they memorized data, had verbal facility, or faithfully gave back conventional theories, found they received low grades from us because they would not compare and debate opposing theories. The complaints of a few such students to the administration probably led to the unjust but widely published accusation that PSA radical professors punished those students who refused to "toe the party line"! In any case the arithmetic grading of students proved quite incompatible with our wish to develop different *kinds* of approaches and to try out new ideas. The attempt to pour radical content into traditional work relations also meant that we were inevitably rewarding the more competitive students (even for "radical" work) with degrees, honors, jobs, or scholarships designed to entrench them in managerial positions in the society we were criticizing. The fact that professors themselves occupied such positions in relation to their often

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poverty-stricken students was, of course, not lost on the students, and in their eyes made us seem less for real.

Trying to create a cooperative learning *community* ran us head-on into the administration's requirement that faculty compete with, police, undercut, or weed out their own weaker or more rebellious brethren, in addition to serving as custodians of the students. PSA's elected committes and one-man/one-vote meetings, although not opposed to Simon Fraser's procedures, "intimidated" half of our senior faculty within the department, as did its profligate sharing of powers with students. PSA teachers, students, and secretaries tried to discipline each other by collective praise or blame and by appeal to a sense of duty to the department and the public, rather than by having seniors threaten juniors with job loss or loss of salary increments. PSA faculty stressed service to the students, especially teaching, whereas the administration stressed research grants, conventional publications, or pleasing Vancouver's elite. Again, PSA teachers published the list of their salaries and tried to get disparities among them reduced. Such crass forms of sacrilege provoked horrified whispers that "that crazy PSA bunch were even *forming a commune and pooling their salaries*"—but this, although mooted, actually never came off.

While perpetually in conflict with the university administration, PSA faculty's necessary acceptance of the terms of their employment brought them into subsidiary and occasional conflict with the radical student movement. Faculty could not, for example, engage in civil disobedience or any form of "direct action" without provoking dismissal—as they eventually did in the final strike. Before that it was hard to decide which occasions might justifiably call for such "final struggles" and which might not. In November 1968 several hundred students from the Universities of British Columbia and Victoria, from Simon Fraser, and from Vancouver City College, occupied the SFU administration building for three days in protest against racial and class discrimination in student admissions. A hundred and fourteen, including many from PSA, were arrested on charges of criminal trespass and eventually received heavy fines. PSA faculty took no part in planning this action, although

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some went to stand between police and students if violence occurred, and most signed statements condemning the president for calling the police. Some students chided PSA faculty for their cautious and "liberal" roles, while most faculty condemned them for supposedly inciting the demonstration. In such crises, worried teachers flapped about rather pitiably, wondering which actions of theirs might be adventurist and which might put brakes on the student movement.

However cautious and tentative, faculty efforts did of course eventually bring on the deluge. After November, administrators made it plain that they were out to get the majority in PSA by any means necessary. A campaign of slander began in the Vancouver press and the university, aimed at our teaching and grading methods, hiring practices, budgeting, public lectures, supposed ideological and political discrimination, "terrorism" (this based on alleged phone calls which none of us ever made), research, and personal styles. From Christmas through spring the faculty's energies were so absorbed in defending the department and justifying their existence that they barely had time to teach their students, let alone pursue new research. The onslaught culminated in the removal of the chairman, the abolition of parity, and the phasing out of seven faculty. Among these, Associate Professor John Leggett was terminated for alleged "unethical conduct" in accepting a one-year professorship from another university while on unpaid research leave from Simon Fraser. This thin accusation came after his arrest at the University of Connecticut for taking part in demonstrations against Dow Chemical and Olin Mathieson. With poetic aptness, I was refused tenure for an article in MONTHLY REVIEW on "Anthropology and Imperialism."* It caused the University Tenure Committee (an economist, a geographer, a pestologist, a chemist, and two educationists) to have "serious doubts about her scholarly objectivity."

The strike for parity and contracts showed the extent to

* "Anthropology and Imperialism," MONTHLY REVIEW, April 1968; also published as "New Proposals for Anthropologists" in *Current Anthropology*, December 1968, vol. 9, no. 5.

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which students were involved in PSA. Over 2,000 risked their degrees, credits, bursaries, or places in graduate school, in their lengthy struggle. Eleven students and three professors received injunctions for picketing, with the threat of damage suits for loss of fees to the university. Hundreds of students withdrew from school rather than enter the "scab classes" hastily set up by the administration to replace those it had cancelled after suspending the striking professors. Twelve students and one secretary fasted for periods up to fifteen days. By contrast, Simon Fraser's largely immigrant faculty proved unusually reactionary or fearful. Most kept quiet under the fatal impression that once PSA's trouble makers were removed, by whatever methods, student rebellion would be ended and the university could return to "normal democratic procedures." In any case Douglas Dowd is probably correct when he concludes that the class interests of university teachers prompt most of them to oppose reduction of their power.*

PSA's experience suggests that radical, or even (truly) "concerned liberal" faculty can carry on intellectual *and* political struggle only for brief periods. Most must probably capitulate, become teaching nomads, or seek a berth elsewhere. Moreover, the small handful of house-Marxists in universities who confine themselves to intellectual criticism and forgo action are gradually losing the niches they have occupied uneasily but on the whole honorably since McCarthyite days. Administrative attacks on the student movement force them to take stands that either betray the movement or else provoke their own removal. The five PSA "Marxists" and social democrats who opposed the strike could not opt out: the administration—or their own blindness—drove them to purge the student movement, as well as to acquiesce in the dismissal of their colleagues.

It may be possible for university exiles to turn defeat into victory. A number of PSA's fired students and suspended

* Douglas Dowd: "Campus Disruptions and the Liberal Left," MONTHLY REVIEW (September 1969). There are stirrings, however. Dozens of protest letters have come in and over 200 social scientists have helped finance PSA's Legal Aid Fund.

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faculty are seeking wage-jobs in Vancouver and have formed a Community Center for Research and Education with several hundred rank-and-file workers, minority-group members, women, and unemployed. The Center, open to the public and financed from contributions, holds workshops and classes which seek to explain day-to-day problems of working men and women in the context of Canada's place in imperialist society. This will not be a free university with course-work of limited duration, but a continuing effort by working intellectuals to share knowledge for collective political struggle. With the students and the secretaries, we will bring PSA off the mountain, and in our end find our beginning.

Instead of dismissing professors for finding something out, let us rather discharge those who do not.

—Robert G. Ingersoll

Education can be dangerous. It is very difficult to make it not dangerous. In fact, it is almost impossible. The only way that you can prevent education from being dangerous is to try to develop an educational system in which the pupil is exposed to no ideas whatsoever.

—Robert H. Hutchins

Much madness is divinest sense
To a discerning eye;
Much sense the starkest madness,
'Tis the majority
In this, as all, prevails.
Assent, and you are sane;
Demur, — you're straightway dangerous,
And handled with a chain.

—Emily Dickinson

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ON THE NUCLEAR FAMILY

PRO:

By Dr. L. Hornstra

As an old Marxist and an old psychoanalyst, I have read with interest Margaret Benston's article, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," in the September 1969 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW. She rightly approaches the problem by first making the distinction between socialized and private labor, i.e., work for the market giving exchange-value and work for direct consumption having only use-value. The product of the work a woman does in her home has use-value, not exchange value. The author then says: "The material basis for the inferior status of women is to be found in just this definition of women. In a society in which money determines value, women are a group who work outside the money economy. Their work is not worth money, is therefore valueless, is therefore not even real work. And women themselves, who do this valueless work, can hardly be expected to be worth [I should prefer to say "valued," L.H.] as much as men. . . ." She compares the work of the mother-wife with some aspects of precapitalistic labor still found here and there among peasants and farmers who, while producing mainly for the market, still supply a very few of their own needs.

The conclusion the author finally draws is that the liberation of women can only be brought about by the socialization, i.e., the industrialization, of housework and the incorporation

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of women into the labor force. She recognizes the resistance this often evokes (in both men and women), and says that she visualizes not a life in barracks—which indeed could only result from total industrialization of women's work under capitalism—but rather a humane industrialization as would occur under socialism.

One is led to wonder, however, what difference there would be between capitalistic barracks and humane living conditions under socialism if socialism is visualized as a kind—possibly even a benevolent kind—of state socialism, especially since we have not yet had a chance to observe any other form of socialism.

It seems to me that the author has drawn her conclusions about the liberation of women a bit too hastily. She compares the work done by a woman in the home with the farmer's small amount of production for his own use. In Friesland, one of the northernmost provinces of The Netherlands, I live among farmers, and it is quite plain that production for home use no longer exists. The farmer sells all his milk wholesale and his wife buys bottled milk, margarine, and cheese at the store. He no longer keeps chickens, and the poultry farmer will not sell me a chicken because his entire production goes to the wholesaler. Crops are restricted to one or two kinds—cabbages, onions, potatoes or the like—and except for the small share of the potatoes consumed by his family the farmer (or rather his wife) buys food, even vegetables, at the store.

But the pre-capitalistic kind of production exists nonetheless, and this private production is even increasing. The city dweller, having struggled to obtain a piece of ground of his own, grows not only flowers on it but also vegetables and fruit. After retirement, people move to the country and grow vegetables and keep chickens. Now that they have become more prosperous, workingmen buy food in cans because in the past the meager diet imposed by their low wages meant that their wives never learned to cook. But others, women and also more and more men, cook with pleasure and make an art of it. The workingman's wife no longer knits the family's socks, stockings, and sweaters but buys them at the store. But many women

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and young girls knit for the pleasure of making their own sweaters or a scarf for a man. This tendency will increase as the work-week becomes shorter, leisure time longer, and retirement earlier.

Many socialists have an antiquated conception of a socialistic future. And since recent attempts at socialism have for the most part been confined to backward countries, the obsolescence of socialistic ideas in most of the capitalistic countries has steadily increased.

If we manage not to destroy ourselves with nuclear and other weapons before then, a socialistic future will consist not of men and women with an enormous sense of responsibility gaily singing as they stride along to the factory each morning after depositing the babies and toddlers in crèches with trained nurses and shiny toys, but rather of a future in which industrial and agricultural production is so highly developed and automated that it requires very few people for very few hours of the day during very few years of their lives, and in which this participation in production no longer determines the social, cultural, and personal value of the individual. Human living will take place in the time not spent in producing for the market.

The distinction between men and women with respect to participation in the market economy will disappear, not because women—released from the work associated with housekeeping, children, family, and other use-value production—will enthusiastically join men in exchange-value production, but for the simple reason that industrial production will have become so vast and so automatic that it will be far less obtrusive and have much less importance in determining the value of the individual. In a socialist society, creativity in producing things with only use-value will be more highly esteemed than individual participation in the production of things with exchange-value. (I shall not touch here on the fact that a socialistic market is not the same as a capitalistic market.)

Ways of living will change enormously too. The production of innumerable things will cease, while that of others will increase tremendously. Just because of this abundance, people

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will live much more simply, sparely, and plainly; the arrangement of their houses will have more of the Japanese or Shaker styles. The family unit will continue to exist because it provides the best conditions for the development of the child up to the age of seven, with a mother and a father. But the structure of the family will be less stringent because the economic basis of this unit, with the present split between man-breadwinner and wife-drudge, will have disappeared. When each family has a small, easily operated, omnipotent, free source of energy and costless well-balanced meals can be prepared in a few minutes at home or elsewhere, elaborate cooking can constitute a creative, purely use-value production. If a woman is no longer obligated, either economically or ideologically, to bear children, then the having of children and caring for them herself for many years (with all the conveniences industry will to an increasing degree provide) will come to mean a rich creativity, one she will not rob herself of by using crèches and nurses, the more so because children are harmed by them.

There will also be less pressure on the family. The changes in housing and ways of living will mean that children live in a wider world: parents need not be the only ones to nourish a child. And friendship, which is now so often distorted by the demands of the jealous family unit, will assume a much greater importance for both men and women.

What I have been trying to illustrate with these sketchy examples is that, remarkably enough, there has been almost no change in ideas concerning the socialistic future since the nineteenth century. Margaret Benston's analysis of the present position of women is accurate, but the solution to the problem does not lie in the woman's becoming, like the man, a slave of the market economy, but in the liberation of both men and women from the inevitable patterns of capitalistic economy. Today, women produce only use-values, men market-values. Yes. But under socialism the machine will produce for the market and men and women and young people for their own use. In other words: human beings will increase not in value but in worth.

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CON:

By Bobbye Ortiz

The concept of the nuclear family as the very essence, the *sine qua non* of male-female/parent-child relationships—a concept of which Dr. Hornstra is clearly an enthusiastic adherent—qualifies as one of those "eternal formulas without origin or progress" which Marx and Engels denounced so vehemently a hundred years ago and which still persist today. Until recently it has for the most part escaped head-on attack by radical analysts of social institutions in both capitalist and existing socialist societies, and criticism has been focused on isolated problems within the rigid categories fixed by conventional sociology, economics, and psychology.*

Other institutions—the school and the university, the law, the church—have been exposed repeatedly as ailing and mortal; and it is accepted that their piously proclaimed purpose of personal enlightenment, salvation, and justice for all serves primarily to conceal their real function, which is to bolster and facilitate the functioning of a class-based society for the benefit of its rulers. But the nuclear family has remained thickly veiled in mystification, allowing it to appear as a fixed, virtually "instinctive" form of social relationship, arisen out of immaculate

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* Not surprisingly, those who have recently begun to question the nuclear family as an institution are its primary victims: women and young people. In the twenties and thirties, important theoretical explorations of this subject were made by Wilhelm Reich (see especially *The Sexual Revolution,* fourth ed., rev. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1969), Emma Goldman, and Alexandra Kollontai—who wrote at that early stage of the Russian Revolution in which new forms of human relationships were being explored and encouraged. (All works by the latter two are out of print.)

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conception, and trailing clouds of glory. True, in this its late-capitalist phase of existence, it is clearly suffering from severe dysfunction, but this apparently does not destroy the conviction that it will undergo a reincarnation under socialism, enabling it to continue serving the needs of man, woman, and child forevermore.

Radicals who have subjected social institutions of the past and present to severe scrutiny and analysis have understood them to be the product of a class-based society's need—more precisely, the dominant class's need. It has been acknowledged that the waxing and waning of such institutions is not a function of any inherent worth or wickedness, nor are they the product of a conscious choice made by enlightened or tyrannical leaders; rather, they are determined by the changing of such needs.* But, for Dr. Hornstra and many others, the nuclear family is apparently thought to exist unfettered by any laws of social development or necessity. It is and always will be—*secula seculorum*—both necessary and desirable.

It would be inconceivable for an alleged socialist to claim that slavery is an intrinsically good institution which had merely been deformed in practice by earlier, exploitative societies, and which could and should be maintained under socialism in a "humanized" and rationalized form—with, perhaps, communal ownership of slaves, a six-hour working day, paid vacations, and decent housing. Yet, Dr. Hornstra apparently assumes that the nuclear family is intrinsically a good and immortal institution which has been deformed by the exigencies of profit-based social systems, but which could and should be maintained in a socialist society—with simplified cooking and housekeeping facilities, free sources of energy, guaranteed source of income to the (male) breadwinner, etc.

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* "What is society, whatever its forms may be? . . . Are men free to choose this or that form of society for themselves? By no means. Assume a particular form of commerce and consumption. Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce, and consumption and you will have a corresponding social institution, a corresponding organization of the *family*, of orders or of classes, in a word, a corresponding civil society." Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, 1963; emphasis added), p. 180.

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Dr. Hornstra's vision is utopian—not primarily in terms of the traditional *content* of most pre-Marxian socialist utopias but in the underlying voluntarism that characterizes it.* To borrow an apposite critical description made by Engels of a contemporary, he "puts forward his claim to an 'authoritative' system of a new social order—not evolved out of the historically developed material at his disposal . . . , but constructed out of his sovereign head, out of his mind pregnant with ultimate truths. . . . He . . . is . . . the latest utopian."[1]** In the case of the utopian socialists, they leapt beyond the historically developed material at their disposal. Dr. Hornstra, if one can say that he leaps at all, lands in the center of the present-day bourgeois society of industrialized Western countries. He, like others before him, "imagines that the modern bourgeois family can be torn from its whole economic foundations without thereby transforming its whole form."[2]

Dr. Hornstra decrees certain "truths" which he finds to be so self-evident that he offers no supporting facts or argument, even though the rejection of such claims has provided much of the foundation for recent movements of women organized as an oppressed sector. For example: "The having of children and caring for them [by the mother] for many years will come to mean a rich creativity, one she will not rob herself of by using crèches or nurses, the more so because children are harmed by them." And the "family unit will continue to exist because it provides the best conditions for the development of the child up to the age of seven, with a mother and a father."

Would Dr. Hornstra reject the assertion that it is the "law of the division of labor which lies at the root of the division into classes"?[3] Does he assume that an institution which arose

* Of all the nineteenth-century utopians, perhaps it is with Proudhon that Dr. Hornstra has the closest affinity of content, and Marx's comment on the former is equally applicable to the latter: "Is not M. Proudhon strangely deluding himself when he sets up his petty-bourgeois sentimentality—I am referring to his declamations about home, conjugal love, and all such banalities—in opposition to socialist sentimentality? . . . Like a holy man, a pope, he excommunicates poor sinners and sings the glories of the petty bourgeoisie and of the miserable patriarchal and amorous illusions of the domestic hearth." *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.

** Numbered notes will be found at the end of the article.

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to facilitate the development of a class society can continue to play a role in a society in which classes have been abolished? Would he deny that the first division of labor was that between man and woman, and that the first form of property "lies in the family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband," and that "this latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first property"?[4] Is the family, which was the *first* form of property, then destined, in Dr. Hornstra's vision of socialist society, to remain as the last (and enduring) form of property, after all other forms have been eliminated?

Does Dr. Hornstra assume the possibility of a true burgeoning of human potential so long as that potential is fettered by the division of labor? If socialism aspires to bring an end to the urban-rural and the manual-intellectual division of labor, on what grounds is the male-female division to be exempted?

> In the division of labor, man* is also divided. All other physical and mental faculties are sacrificed to the development of one single activity. This stunting of man's faculties grows in the same measure as the division of labor. . . .[5]

The fact of such stunting is not determined by the specific work which an individual carries out; he or she who must work *exclusively* in the factory, laboratory, library, or home is stunted. And even when child-rearing is invested with the rich creativity that Dr. Hornstra attributes to it, it is nonetheless work.**

Surely, then, women and men, whom Marx has described as "rich in every human need," will not be truly free until they have the "opportunity to develop and exercise *all* [their] *faculties, physical and mental, in all directions.*"[6]

Dr. Hornstra's rejection of socialized child-care and his

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* Both Marx and Engels followed the prevailing custom of casually subsuming half the world into the category of the other half.

** "There is some resistance to regarding child-rearing as a job. That labor is involved . . . can be clearly seen when exchange value is involved—when the work is done by baby-sitters, nurses, child-care centers, or teachers." Margaret Benston, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," MONTHLY REVIEW, September 1969, p. 19.

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insistence on individual care of the child by the mother is consistent with his highly privatized, non- (anti- ?) social, technocratic conception of life under socialism. It would appear that socialism's ultimate aim is to make escape into the domestic cocoon possible, and that work—in fact, any socialized, community, or group endeavor— is merely a necessary evil, to be kept a minimum. And in their stead? Hobbies. Of all the utopias ever invented, on paper or in actual experiment, this one most resembles that which "sensitive," educated, middle-class intellectuals who want neither to immerse themselves in the sordidness, venality, and vulgarity of bourgeois existence nor to immerse themselves in a revolutionary struggle against it seek out for themselves on weekends or vacations or in retirement.

When humanity finally makes the leap "from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom," surely it will not opt for this anemic, dilettantish, socialist-suburbia that Dr. Hornstra envisages. There are areas of human potential which have never been free to flourish and areas of psychic neglect or distortion which must be examined and altered or eliminated in the new society, if socialism is indeed more than the transfer of the ownership of the means of production, more than shorter hours and higher pay, more than security. Surely a thoroughgoing transformation of society implies a thoroughgoing transformation of its personal components—the creation of Che Guevara's "new man" (and new woman).

Dr. Hornstra's insistence on carrying the institutional baggage of the past into the future would preclude the re-evaluation of two of these areas in which it is badly needed: sexuality and non-sexual love. The concomitant of the nuclear family is monogamy; and its concomitants are prostitution, paid and unpaid, and infidelity—that is, the violation not only of a legal commitment but of an untenable moral contract between two people. Not even its most fervent supporters look on monogamy as an institution devised to foster the full development of sexuality. Is it not possible that socialist society will explore other forms of alliances, rejecting the institution of monogamy which, as Wilhelm Reich asserts, is "at variance with the processes of psychic and physical development"?[7] When women and men are at last

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free and, in Engels's words, "with full consciousness, will fashion their own history," will they fashion a history that continues to ignore the legitimate demands of sexuality?

The nuclear family has served to define and authorize two kinds of permissible love relationships; it excludes those that do not fall into the category of (1) blood ties, or (2) sexual attraction, both of which are required to have legal sanction. Surely we can expect that in a socialist society love will no longer be compartmentalized and exclusive, its permissible objects strictly defined, its protagonists playing the role of possessor or possessed.

Even in existing socialist societies, where the capacity to transform human relationships is conditioned by the existence of a brutally hostile capitalist encirclement, love for children has found new and full expression, both in governmental policies and in terms of direct human relations, which transcends the family unit. China, Cuba, North Vietnam, the USSR—all come close to being "child-oriented" societies. And it is not unrealistic to expect that the full development of socialism will make available to all children institutional forms of child-nurture that will utilize the capacities of those women—and men—who find their particular "rich creativity" in the loving care and education of children, without regard to blood ties.

The love that arises out of common struggle—even at the stage where struggle will be against nature rather than against human oppressors, and for the expanding of scientific, intellectual, and artistic horizons—will come into its own. Che Guevara has expressed pre-figurements of what might be called comradely love: "The true revolutionary is moved by strong feelings of love." And, to a letter from a Maria Rosa Guevara asking if they were related, he answered: "I don't think you and I are very closely related, but if you are capable of trembling with indignation each time that an injustice is committed in the world, we are comrades, and *that is more important.*" (Emphasis added.)

A few final observations. It is hardly debatable that, in Marx's words, "it is not for us to create a plan for the future

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that will hold for all time." Excessive speculating and blueprint drawing are of questionable value, and must not replace theoretical and practical involvement in more immediate stages of struggle. But it is also true that "the complete self-fulfillment of man [and woman] is a dream that must be dreamed."[8] The dream that revolutionary women are dreaming today and the revolution they are fighting for, in those countries where they fight as an oppressed sector of society, bear no resemblance to Dr. Hornstra's dream. Indeed, they are fighting *against* that which he advocates and *for* that which he rejects.

NOTES

1. *Anti-Dühring* (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 290.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
4. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 21.
5. *Anti-Dühring*, p. 318.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 320 (emphasis added).
7. *The Sexual Revolution*, p. 129.
8. Paul Nizan, "Sur l'humanisme," in *Paul Nizan, Intellectuel Communiste.* (Paris: Maspero, 1967), p. 230.

[Marriage] is like that other paternal arrangement—capitalism. It robs man of his birthright, stunts his growth, poisons his body, keeps him in ignorance, in poverty and dependence, and then institutes charities that thrive on the last vestige of man's self-respect.

The institution of marriage makes a parasite of woman, an absolute dependent. It incapacitates her for life's struggle, annihilates her social consciousness, paralyzes her imagination, and then imposes its gracious protection, which is in reality a snare, a travesty, on human character.

—Emma Goldman, *Marriage and Love*, 1914

Anybody who knows anything of history knows that great social changes are impossible without the feminine ferment.

—Marx, *Letter to Kugelman*, December 12, 1868

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Desperate Youth

Young people all over the planet are asked to accept a world designed and built by previous generations. Many of the ideas and institutions of present-day society are outmoded. Certainly the young people had no part in their production. In any case, impatient youth is asked to take its cue from crabbed age and agree that "whatever is, is right."

Garments of the past are of varied shapes, colors, sizes. Haircuts, shirts, skirts and trousers, the schools, sports, movies, radio, television, traffic rules, army service, the assembly-line—all these and many others are ready-mades, which checkmate, channel, confuse, and irk the young.

Rebellion by youth is an age-old story, repeated of late years when the possibilities of life are expanding beyond the social restrictions of the period.

French youth, centered in Paris, rebelled in the late spring of 1968. The upsurge was led by students who were outraged by the inadequacies and iniquities of French higher education, coined slogans, called protest meetings, took to the streets, threw up barricades, occupied buildings. The revolt began in the universities, then extended to the high schools. Workers, supporting the students, went on strike. The movement spread to the French provinces. Thousands of students shouted their demands while millions of idle workers stood watching.

The French student revolt of 1968 had neither a general staff nor a unified program. It was a spontaneous gesture, an expression of deep dissatisfaction and disgust that gave students a chance to publicize their complaints. Since it had no generally accepted program, it could not achieve concrete results. As it

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fell apart during the summer of 1968 it left a bitter taste, even in the mouths of the most militant.

I spent more than two months in France, beginning with late December 1969. Among the young people who gave so much and who hoped so much during the May-June 1968 struggle, I found discouragement, disillusion, pessimism. The educational system within which they are compelled to live and function has been reformed here and there, but France minus de Gaulle is much the same as it was two years ago.

And France outside the universities? It is still polluting, exploiting, corrupting. Could such a spontaneous splendid effort as that of May-June 1968 produce such sordid consequences? Again and again the question is asked and usually left unanswered.

Outraged French youths, appalled by the shabbiness of the chaotic world in which they live, and despairing of any immediate collective action, decided to play their last cards, taking the desperate chance and throwing their lives into the balance. Buddhists in Vietnam had shown them the way. Gasoline was available and cheap. They would turn themselves into torches of protest in the hope that the too placid world would at last stop, look, and listen.

An epidemic of suicides by fire swept across France in the early weeks of 1970. On January 17 a seventeen-year-old high school boy of Lille, one of the large cities of France, covered himself with gasoline and burned himself alive as a protest against events in Biafra. Three days later an 18-year-old high school boy of the same city met death in the same way, within sight of his fellow students. He left behind a carefully written four-page letter in which he declared: "I do this as a sign of protest against violence." *Le Monde* (1/22/70) ran a story on "The Second Suicide by Fire in Lille," giving excerpts from letters of Robert Gerekens, second of the two suicides.

Nice-Matin began its article on the two suicides with an excerpt from a statement issued by delegates from Lille high-school students: "We do not approve of the suicide of two city students, but we wish that people would reflect on problems which are theirs, as they were also the problems of the suicides."

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The *Nice-Matin* article reported the impressive pageant of 800 Lille high-school students, self-policed, who marched for three miles through the city streets as a memorial to their self-immolated comrades.

The French weekly *L'Express* (1/26/70) devoted a page to the Lille suicides. Françoise Giroud, editor of the paper and author of the article, noted that the youths had died as a protest against conditions which they could not set right, and asked who was responsible for these conditions. In France, she wrote, there are 500-800 suicides each year of young people of fifteen to twenty-five. This figure is, except for accidents on the highways, the most important cause of death in that age group.

On February 1, 1970, French newspapers reported seven suicides by fire within ten days. Through these troubled weeks in which French youth was indulging in self-destruction, protest against the status quo followed more customary courses. As spring approached, the students grew more restless. Not only in Paris but in provincial cities as well, students attacked the educational establishment, striking, occupying buildings, fighting with the police. The French authorities have become nervous and touchy.

French economy is passing through a technological revolution which has rendered obsolete many practices and institutions of yesteryear but, by and large, France is governed by conservatives. French educators have resented and resisted the revolutionary forces. Among leading French institutions in 1968, higher education in its theories and practices was one of the most hidebound and out of touch with the changing world. The student uprising was a logical consequence of this confrontation between the technical revolution and the medieval structure of French higher education.

Grudgingly, during the past two years, the French Establishment has thrown reformist crumbs to its restless rebellious students. Wise in their generation, the students recognize reformism when they see it, and increasingly they reject it.

Whether the prevalent dissatisfaction and unrest among French youth will break out in May 1970 as it did in May 1968, one thing seems certain: unless the French Establish-

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ment sees the handwriting on the wall and modernizes its high schools and universities, there will be an educational revolution that will extend far beyond the campuses.

"Protective Reaction" by the United States

Yankee ingenuity turns out slogans as well as gadgets. United States Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird tried his hand at the game in Saigon on February 11. The *New York Times* news service quotes Secretary Laird: "We presently use the policy of protective reaction to guarantee the safety of American troops in South Vietnam and also as far as Laos and Cambodia are concerned. We will continue to follow the policy of protective reaction to protect our American airmen as well as our ground forces."

South Vietnam, occupied through 1969 by as many as half a million United States armed personnel, is the battle-ground of an undeclared war that has continued over a decade. North Vietnam has been battered, blasted, and devastated for months and even years on end by United States bombers and naval vessels. Laos and Cambodia, independent neighboring countries, have been invaded and occupied by United States armed forces. In legal theory these Southeast Asian countries are sovereign states. In practice, all four are battle-grounds on which native peoples have defended themselves against land, sea, and air invaders from France, Japan, and lately from the United States.

Against this background Washington authorities have authorized and justified acts of war which have involved wholesale destruction of property and the killing and maiming of tens of thousands of armed personnel and hundreds of thousands of civilians.

These acts of aggression, occupation, and destruction have been committed by United States forces under the policy of "protective reaction." United States armed forces have occupied the land, sea, and air space of these "sovereign" Southeast Asian states by any available means, including the use of the most destructive modern military hardware.

"Protective reaction" is being used as an authorization and

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justification of a war waged by a great power against poorly armed and relatively defenseless people. It is a bully's war carried on thousands of miles from home territory under the flimsy and mendacious concept of "self-defense."

The Vietnam war is more than a bully's war. It is a precedent, laid down by a leading nation, that will be used to cloak continuous armed struggle.

More "Protective Reaction"

Israel's newly formed ministry, with Premier Golda Meir in the chair, is following the principle of protective reaction in its dealings with neighbors. The Six-Day War of 1967 enabled the Israeli armed forces to occupy large areas in Sinai, the Jordan Valley and the Golan Heights, formerly controlled by the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armed forces.

At the outset the occupation was largely military. The new territories were held, as they had been won, by armed force. Since 1967 Israeli settlers have moved in, Israeli civilian control has been extended, and Israeli technology is being installed in agriculture, industry, transport, and trade. Israeli interests close to the new frontiers have been subject to harassment by artillery fire and guerrilla raids. Israeli civilians and military forces have suffered considerable damage.

Invoking the principle of preventive reaction, the Israeli air forces and commandos have been battering Arab positions for the past several months, destroying military installations, grabbing bits of military equipment, and taking prisoners.

Questioned as to the purposes of such warlike acts, Defense Minister Dayan and Prime Minister Meir have stated: (1) that they are wiping out Arab positions from which artillery fire and raiding parties can inflict damage upon Israeli territory; 2) that they are pushing back Arab positions to lines which will prove "defensive" for the Israelis, (3) that they are proving to the Arab peoples that the Arab governments, which have been threatening to crush Israel, are so weak that they cannot even defend their own citizens against Israeli attacks.

Ever since Independence Day, in 1948, Arab governments have attempted to use armed force to limit and finally to de-

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stroy the government of Israel. Ever since Independence Day, Israeli armed forces have been pushing back Arab positions and extending the Israeli frontiers. The big push to date was the Six-Day War of 1967.

At each stage of these military operations Israeli spokesmen have insisted that their actions were purely defensive, despite the fact that the scenes of action were located in "enemy" territory, far beyond Israel's frontiers.

Israel is using the policy of protective reaction to justify acts of military aggression. Whatever the rationalization, Israel is using war as an instrument of policy. The Israeli retort—that they will stop shooting after the Egyptians and Syrians stop shooting—passes the buck back and forth while the shooting continues.

Washington, in Vietnam, is using armed force to implement its policies. Israel and the neighboring Arab states are using armed force to implement their policies. In both cases, armed force is being used. In fact, if not legally, shooting wars are in progress.

The League of Nations Covenant, the Peace Treaty of 1928, and the United Nations Charter have prohibited the use of war as a means of enforcing policy. For half a century war has been outlawed by existing world authority. During the same half-century armaments have been improved and stockpiled by big and little powers, and acts of war have been committed. The war in Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli conflict are the latest episodes in the long series of warlike acts.

Twice, during the past half-century of endemic warfare, general war has broken out and spread its deadly contagion among the peoples of Europe, North America, and Asia. The major nations are more completely prepared for war today than they have been at any time in recent history. Will "protective reactions" continue until a third epidemic of war devastates and shatters human society? Or will peoples rouse themselves and act before the fatal hour of general war again strikes?

Half the misery in the world comes of want of courage to speak and to hear the truth plainly.

—Harriet Beecher Stowe

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
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seems to us to be fair to both sides, and does not put the author in the position of begging publishers to reduce fees which, because the advance is too small, are "coming out of my own pocket."

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The Canadian province of Manitoba has the only social democratic government in North America (under the New Democratic Party). We were glad to learn that the Party's youth affiliate (Manitoba Young New Democrats) is in the process of breaking away from the sterile traditions of social democracy and striking out on what appears to be a genuinely radical course. "At our recent annual convention," writes a member of the MYND, "we overwhelmingly adopted a manifesto entitled "For an Independent Socialist Canada." And he adds: "Much of the analysis is directly from works by those at MR (footnotes being inappropriate for a manifesto of this nature). We very much appreciate the work that those associated with MR have done which is greatly helping us in our struggle to overcome American imperialism and establish a socialist Canada." And the last sentence reads: "Our movement is growing rapidly." We're glad to be of help and wish the MYND great successes.

A Japanese friend writes: "When I was in Hanoi for a month last December, I contacted members of the Institute of Economics and the Commission of Historical Sciences. I was quite astonished to learn that they had read a number of Sweezy and Baran's works, although MR looked to me to be a hard-to-get periodical there." If by chance this should be read by comrades in Hanoi, we would like them to know that we would be honored to establish direct contact with them and to send them MR materials which would interest them.

From time to time we receive a bequest from a reader who felt, during his or her lifetime, that financial support would help make possible the continuance of MR as a completely independent socialist magazine. Any reader who may be moved to follow this example should note that the will ought to state exactly that the bequest is to: "Monthly Review, Inc., of 116 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011."

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